Discussion of Gottlieb Polyakova Rinz Shiplett Udalova "Who Values Human Capitalists' Human Capital? Healthcare spending and physician earnings"

Owen Zidar Princeton and NBER

NBER Health Care Summer Institute Meeting

July 2020

Summary

Great paper!

- **1 Excellent data and descriptive work:** physician pay over the lifecycle
 - Earn about 360K per year, varies widely across specialties, and biz income key at top
- Effect of government intervention on pay
 - Use Medicaid fee variation in ACA (Alexander and Schnell, 2019; Polsky et al (2015)) to find about half goes to physicians
 - Use Cabral Geruso Mahoney (2018) approach and find about 20 cents of every dollar of subsidy goes to physicians

Counterfactuals:

- Compare earnings to lawyers, other specialties, and pay structure in Sweden
- Conclude that it's difficult to reduce spending on US healthcare by cutting pay

Outline of Comments

Want a framework to integrate three components:

- Measurement
- 2 Causal effects of government intervention
- Counterfactuals

Key themes to incorporate

- Market for human capital services, relationship to lifetime pay, and quantities
- The behavior and pay of workers versus private business owners
- Importance of non-tax government intervention, especially in healthcare

Physicians prevail among top-owned private firms


2014 S-corporation sample. Statistics in millions of 2014 USD.

	S-corporation Industry (NAICS)	Top 1-0.1 π (\$M)		S-corporation Industry (NAICS)	Top 0.1 π (\$M)
1	Offices of physicians (6211)	9063	1	Other financial investment actvty (5239)	5786
2	Other professional/technical svc (5419)	4778	2	Automobile dealers (4411)	5176
3	Offices of dentists (6212)	4317	3	Oil/gas extraction (2111)	4820
4	Other specialty trade cntrctr (2389)	3893	4	Other professional/technical svc (5419)	4186
5	Legal svc (5411)	3485	5	Offices of physicians (6211)	3621
6	Insurance agencies/brokerages (5242)	2678	6	Computer sys design/related svc (5415)	3206
7	Computer sys design/related svc (5415)	2662	7	Management/techncl consulting svc (5416)	3185
8	Architectural/engineering svc (5413)	2642	8	Other specialty trade cntrctr (2389)	3086
9	Building equipment cntrctr (2382)	2595	9	Legal svc (5411)	2847
10	Restaurants (7225)	2421	10	Misc. durable goods merch whisi (4239)	2836
11	Management/techncl consulting svc (5416)	2196	11	Other fabricated metal prod mfg. (3329)	2727
12	Nonresidential building constr (2362)	1906	12	Other miscellaneous mfg. (3399)	2477
13	Offices of other health practitioners (6213)	1886	13	Activities related to real estate (5313)	2286
14	Misc. durable goods merch whisi (4239)	1684	14	Other heavy constr (2379)	2248
15	Other fabricated metal prod mfg (3329)	1670	15	Nonresidential building constr (2362)	1940

Source: Smith Yagan Zidar Zwick (2019). Note Top 1% and 0.1% thresholds are approx \$400K and \$1.5M

Start with framework for thinking about physical capital

There are two key markets: (1) using capital services and (2) buying capital



where R_t is the **rental price** of using capital services K_t and P_t is the **purchase price**, which depends on the level of investment I_t .

Applying this framework to human capital of physicians

- **1** Stock Adjustment: $K_t = (1 \delta)K_{t-1} + I_t$
 - \bullet K_t is the stock of physician human capital (or number of doctor hours in a location)
 - ullet δ is depreciation (could represent retirement and obsolescence)
 - \bullet I_t is the flow of new human capital (represents new residents, immigrants, and retraining)
 - We want to measure and report these quantities as well as pay
- PDV of pay

$$P_t = R_t + \frac{R_{t+1}(1-\delta)}{(1+r)} + \frac{R_{t+2}(1-\delta)^2}{(1+r)^2} + \dots$$

- **3** Rental market: demand is downward sloping K = D(R)
- **1** Investment market: supply is upward sloping I = S(P)

Implications for physician pay, causal effects, counterfactuals

I'd like to see more integration and focus on determinants of pay, quantities, ε^S , and ε^D

- **1** Demand for local physician services:
 - Local population, demographics, and income
 - Technological growth and capital deepening
 - Government intervention and effects on demand (e.g., Medicaid fees, MA subsidies, etc)
- Supply of local physician services:
 - Number of local doctors, their human capital, hours worked, resident flows
 - To extent many working full time, extra-hours require even higher pay b/c rising disutility of effort (Murphy and Topel, 2016)
 - Some of these services provided via physician laborers and some via small practices, so supply depends in part on span of control and effectiveness of non-physician inputs
 - **§** Substitution across specialties and occupations, and δ are also important determinants

In terms of connecting parts of the paper,

- **1** How do the incidence estimates in part 2 relate to ε^{S} and ε^{D} ?
- ② How do ε^{S} , δ , and ε^{D} inform the counterfactuals?

Part I. Comments on Measurement

- Aggregates are helpful
 - K_t , I_t : How many (new) doctors? By time, place, speciality?
 - ② How many firms/small practices? By time, place, type?
 - How much total pay? By time, place, specialty?
 - Where do the 20% of health resources and 8% of GDP numbers come from exactly? \Rightarrow How big are rents in healthcare and who gets them?
 - How do your business income aggregates compare to SOI stats or SYZZ(2019) stats (15B and 5B of pass-through profits of Top 1-.1% and Top 0.1% in 2014)?
- Risk: by time, place, specialty? Malpractice insurance, income volatility, gov't policy, etc?
- Industrial structure: inform anecdotes of sole props becoming big multi-owner practices?
- Olarify what spine of dataset is for different stats—all docs in ACS or all from NPPES file?
- "Top 1" definition: fiscal income vs. distribution of income and national accounts (DINA)
- Adjusted gross income (AGI) affected by capital gains and deductions

AGI (line 37) affected by capital gains (13), deductions (36), etc

Income	7 Wages, salaries, tips, etc. Attach Form(s) W-2	. 7			
	8a Taxable interest. Attach Schedule B if required	. 8a			
	b Tax-exempt interest. Do not include on line 8a 8b				
	9a Ordinary dividends. Attach Schedule B if required	. 9a			
	b Qualified dividends 9b				
	11 Alimony received	. 11			
was withheld.	12 Business income or (loss). Attach Schedule C or C-EZ	. 12			
	13 Capital gain or (loss). Attach Schedule D if required. If not required, check here	□ 13			
	14 Other gains or (losses). Attach Form 4797	. 14	П		
	15a IRA distributions . 15a b Taxable amount	. 15b	П		
see man detions.	16a Pensions and annuities 16a b Taxable amount	. 16b	\neg		
	17 Rental real estate, royalties, partnerships, S corporations, trusts, etc. Attach Schedule	e E 17			
Attach Formis) W-2 here, Also with Also with Also with Also with Also was withheld. If you did not get a W-2, see instructions. If you did not get a W-2	18 Farm income or (loss). Attach Schedule F	. 18	П		
	19 Unemployment compensation	. 19	П		
			\neg		
	21 Other income. List type and amount	21	\Box		
	22 Combine the amounts in the far right column for lines 7 through 21. This is your total income I	▶ 22			
	23 Educator expenses				
	24 Certain business expenses of reservists, performing artists, and				
	fee-basis government officials. Attach Form 2106 or 2106-EZ 24				
Income	25 Health savings account deduction. Attach Form 8889 . 25				
	26 Moving expenses. Attach Form 3903	9a 10 111 12 13 14 15b 16b Schedule E 17 18 20b 21 Il income ▶ 22			
	27 Deductible part of self-employment tax. Attach Schedule SE . 27				
	28 Self-employed SEP, SIMPLE, and qualified plans 28				
	29 Self-employed health insurance deduction 29				
	30 Penalty on early withdrawal of savings 30				
	31a Alimony paid b Recipient's SSN ▶ 31a				
	32 IRA deduction				
	33 Student loan interest deduction				
	34 Tuition and fees. Attach Form 8917				
	35 Domestic production activities deduction. Attach Form 8903 35				
	36 Add lines 23 through 35	. 36			
	37 Subtract line 36 from line 22. This is your adjusted gross income	▶ 37	\neg		

Part II and III. Comments on Causal Effects and Counterfactuals


- 1'd imagine there are many inframarginal doctors who benefit from reforms
- On the incidence results relate to the seemingly high elasticities implied in counterfactual section?
- How does the market for physician services relate to other health markets and lead to spillovers (e.g., market for nurses, insurance, etc) and how should that affect conclusions about the size and allocation of rents in healthcare?

Overall, excellent paper, great data, and emphasis on importance of human capital, business income, and non-tax government interventions

Bonus MaterialCompiled by Dustin Swonder


Physician earnings over the lifetime

Friedman and Kuznets (1954) figure 20



GPRSU (2020) figure 1 (a)

(A) Average Earnings by Age




- Friedman and Kuznets, GPRSU show steep earnings increase shortly after starting practice
- Friedman Kuznets sample peaks \approx 20 years later with steep decline; GPRSU see later peak (\approx 30 years after starting) and less steep decline

Geographic distribution of physician earnings


Friedman Kuznets (1954) table 18

Arithmetic Mean Income, Relatives of Arithmetic Mean Income and Number of Persons Covered, by Region

Professions and All Persons



GPRSU (2020) figure 3





Notes: maptile had not been invented in 1954.

- Friedman Kuznets show physicians do best in New England, Mid Atlantic, Pacific; flipped in GPRSU
- ullet Friedman Kuznets show between-region differences driven by differences community composition of region: physicians do best in medium-large (pop = 100k-1.5M) communities, worst in small communities (pop < 2500); not explored in GPRSU


Physician earnings dropped 1929-1932, climbed 1932-1936 and 2005-2018

Friedman Kuznets (1954) figure 7 GPRSU (2020) figure 2





Estimates of physician earnings over the lifetime by specialization



- Both studies show financial returns to specialization
- Friedman Kuznets argue this is selection: only excellent general practitioners can afford to specialize (doctors specialized after spending time as general practitioners)
- GPRSU see returns as compensation for greater training

References

• Friedman, Milton and Simon Kuznets (1954). *Income from Independent Professional Practice*. National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/books/frie54-1.